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NEGLIGENT DISRUPTION OF GENETIC 
PLANNING: CARVING OUT A NEW TORT 
THEORY TO ADDRESS NOVEL QUESTIONS OF 




In March 2017, the Singapore Court of Appeal1 awarded damages for a 
previously unarticulated tort—the “loss of genetic affinity.”2  In the case 
before the Court, a husband and wife underwent in-vitro fertilization (IVF)3 
treatment, and subsequently delivered a baby girl (Baby P).4  Several months 
after the birth of Baby P, the parents noticed that the child’s skin tone and 
hair color were quite different from their own and that of their son, who had 
also been conceived using IVF.5  After a brief investigation, the couple 
learned that the clinic had inadvertently fertilized the mother’s extracted 
ovum with sperm from a man other than her husband.6  The couple brought 
suit for breach of contract and negligence, seeking “upkeep” damages 
equivalent to the cost of raising Baby P until Baby P is “financially self 
reliant.”7  While the court declined to award the full amount of damages 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2019, Fordham University School of Law; M.A., 2014, University of New 
Mexico; B.A. 2012, Colby College.  Thank you to Professor Kimani Paul-Emile for her 
instrumental advice and mentorship, and to the Fordham Law Review Online editors and staff 
for their thoughtful feedback.  I would also like to thank my family and friends for their support 
and encouragement. 
 
 1. The Court of Appeal is Singapore’s equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court. See 
Structure of the Courts, SUP. CT. SINGAPORE, https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/about-us/the-
supreme-court/structure-of-the-courts [https://perma.cc/27MS-3J9N] (last visited Mar. 6, 
2019). 
 2. ACB v. Thomson Med. Pte. Ltd., [2017] SGCA 20, paras. 125–36 (Sing.) [hereinafter 
Thomson I]. 
 3. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) defines IVF as “[a]n [assisted reproductive 
technology] procedure that involves removing eggs from a woman’s ovaries and fertilizing 
them outside her body.  The resulting embryos are then transferred into a woman’s uterus 
through the cervix.” CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2015 ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 64 (2017) [hereinafter 2015 CDC 
REPORT]. 
 4. Thomson I, SCGA 20 ¶ 3. 
 5. ACB v. Thomson Med. Pte. Ltd, [2015] SGHC 9 ¶ 3 [hereinafter Thomson II]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. ¶ 5. 
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sought, it ultimately entered judgment for 30 percent of the requested amount 
on the grounds that the couple’s “loss of genetic affinity” with Baby P 
constituted actual, compensable harm.8 
With an increasing number of people relying on assisted reproductive 
technology (ART),9 issues pertaining to the mishandling of genetic 
material—like the Singapore case—have made headlines in recent years.10  
Objectively, it is reasonable to enable plaintiffs on the unfortunate end of an 
ART mishap to seek legal redress, particularly when the outcome of that 
mishap directly contravenes the agreement between the ART provider and 
the intended parent(s).  But this territory becomes ethically fraught when a 
healthy child is born following an ART mistake.  In these situations, the harm 
suffered is not a simple tort or contractual breach because it implicates 
ethically perilous questions concerning the value of a child.  Moreover, 
without careful phrasing of the cause of action for these types of claims, the 
law threatens to stigmatize the child by undermining the child’s very 
existence. 
This Essay will address current concerns pertaining to ART-related 
negligence, and ultimately recommends the adoption of a new tort—
negligent disruption of genetic planning (NDGP).  This tort would enable 
plaintiffs to recover damages when an ART clinic’s negligent actions thwart 
reproductive planning, while simultaneously balancing the serious moral and 
ethical questions that arise in these situations.  This argument proceeds in 
three Parts.  Part I discusses the technological evolution of ART and gives 
examples of ART-related negligence cases that have occurred in the United 
States.  Part II lays out the current U.S. tort remedies relied on by plaintiffs 
in these situations, and then discusses alternate tort-based approaches 
proposed by courts and scholars that find the existing tort landscape 
inadequate.  Finally, Part III evaluates the applicability of existing torts to 
ART-related negligence cases as well as the proposed novel approaches of 
other courts and scholars detailed in Part II.  Because existing theories do not 
adequately balance public policy concerns, the need to protect ART patients, 
and the complex moral and ethical questions surrounding ART, NDGP is 
proposed as a solution to fill the current gap. 
 
 8. Thomson I, SCGA 20 ¶ 150. 
 9. The CDC defines ART as: 
 
All treatments or procedures that include the handling of human eggs or embryos to 
help a woman become pregnant.  ART includes but is not limited to in vitro 
fertilization (IVF), gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), zygote intrafallopian 
transfer (ZIFT), tubal embryo transfer, egg and embryo cryopreservation, egg and 
embryo donation, and gestational surrogacy. 
 
2015 CDC REPORT, supra note 3, at 63. 
 10. See, e.g., Lucy Clarke-Billings, IVF Clinic Error Means Nine Women May Have 
Given Birth to ‘Wrong’ Baby, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 28, 2016, 1:07 PM), http://www.newsweek 
.com/ivf-clinic-netherlands-nine-women-birth-wrong-baby-536669 [https://perma.cc/M7P4-
5Y2C]; Stephanie Smith, Fertility Clinic to Couple: You Got the Wrong Embryos, CNN (Sept. 
22, 2009, 5:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/22/wrong.embryo.family/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/MX26-WEU2]. 
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF ART AND RESULTING LEGAL BATTLES WITHIN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Prior to the advent of modern technology, many of the claims that fall into 
the category of ART-related negligence were biological impossibilities.  But 
today, technological advances enable people who want to become parents to 
conceive in unprecedented ways.  Unfortunately, these novel procedures 
sometimes go awry.  This section first discusses the development of ART, 
and then details examples of U.S. cases concerning ART-related negligence. 
A. Overview of Assisted Reproductive Technology: Technological 
Development and Current Uses 
Until the 1970s, women with non-functioning fallopian tubes were 
considered sterile11 and only had one option if they wanted to conceive—
undergo a very risky surgery with incredibly low success rates.12  But in 
1978, a British woman, Lesley Brown, decided that, rather than suffer 
through a dubiously efficacious surgical procedure, she would try the then-
experimental technique of IVF,13 which until that point, had only resulted “in 
miscarriages and an unsuccessful pregnancy in the fallopian tube.”14  In 
comparison with modern IVF, the technique used on Brown was 
rudimentary: the doctors retrieved Brown’s eggs laparoscopically, fertilized 
the eggs in a laboratory, and transferred a single egg back into Brown’s 
uterus.15  Astonishingly, the procedure succeeded, and a few months later the 
world welcomed the birth of the first “test-tube baby.”16 
Since then, ART has developed at a rapid pace and is more reliable and 
affordable than ever before.17  In 2015—the most recent year for which data 
is available—the CDC reported that American women underwent 231,936 
cycles of ART, 80 percent of which “were started with the intent to transfer 
at least one embryo,” resulting in the births of 72,913 children.18  This data 
 
 11. See Jeff Wang & Mark Sauer, In Vitro Fertilization (IVF): A Review of 3 Decades of 
Clinical Innovation and Technological Advancement, 4 THERAPEUTIC & CLINICAL RISK 
MGMT. 355, 355 (2006). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. Id. at 356. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See generally P. C. Steptoe & R. G. Edwards, Birth After the Reimplantation of a 
Human Embryo, 12 LANCET 366 (1978) (announcing the successful delivery of a baby 
conceived with the aid of IVF). 
 17. See Remah Moustafa Kamel, Assisted Reproductive Technology After the Birth of 
Louise Brown, 14 J. REPROD. INFERTILITY 96, 104–05 (2013).  To be sure, IVF is by no means 
affordable, with the cost per cycle in the United States averaging $12,400. See J. Farley 
Ordovensky Staniec & Natalie J. Webb, Utilization of Infertility Services: How Much Does 
Money Matter?, 42 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 971, 975 (2007).  The high cost of IVF, and the 
general unwillingness of insurance companies to cover the procedure, poses important 
questions of access for low-income, aspiring parents.  For an excellent proposal aimed at 
addressing unequal access to IVF, see Joy J. Liu & Eli Y. Adashi, Selective Justice: State 
Mandates for Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Justice, 1 AM. J. CLINICAL 
& EXPERIMENTAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 53, 53 (2013). 
 18. 2015 CDC REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. 
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represents a 32 percent increase of ART use since 2006, and a 30 percent 
increase in the number of infants born as a result of ART.19  Additionally, 
ART cycles initiated for egg/embryo banking20 increased from roughly 1 
thousand cycles in 2006 to over 45 thousand cycles in 2015.21  This increased 
reliance on ART shows the important role these technologies play in helping 
aspiring parents conceive in the twenty-first century.  However, with 
increased reliance on ART comes a greater risk of errors, like the ones 
illustrated by the following cases. 
B. Recent Cases of ART-Related Negligence in the United States and the 
Relevant Tort-Based Causes of Action Propagated by Plaintiffs 
The following U.S. cases22 raise significant questions about the extent to 
which ART providers open themselves up to liability when they make a 
mistake.23  In each case, the plaintiffs rely on different tort theories in an 
attempt to encapsulate the harm caused by the clinic’s negligence. 
1. Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank: A Child of the “Wrong Race” 
In 2011, Jennifer Cramblett underwent artificial insemination in hopes of 
conceiving a child.24  As part of this process, Cramblett contracted with 
Midwest Sperm Bank (Midwest) to purchase sperm from Donor No. 380 
(380), a Caucasian male selected by Cramblett and her partner.25  Midwest 
shipped the donor’s sperm to Cramblett’s local fertility clinic where she was 
successfully inseminated.26  Roughly five months into her pregnancy, 
Cramblett and her partner decided to conceive another child and 
 
 19. Id. at 50. 
 20. The CDC defines “egg/embryo banking cycles” as, “[a]n ART cycle started with the 
intention of freezing (cryopreserving) all resulting eggs or embryos for potential future use.” 
Id. at 63. 
 21. Id. at 51. 
 22. The focus of this Essay is on tort liability within the U.S. legal system, but it is 
important to note that these issues do not occur exclusively within the United States. See supra 
text accompanying notes 4–8.  For another example of ART-negligence, see Nina Siegal, 
Dutch Fertility Clinic Investigates Possible Sperm Mix-Up, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/28/world/europe/netherlands-fertility-clinic-ivf.html 
[https://perma.cc/XGH2-CQNP]. 
 23. A number of cases brought within the United States touch on this idea from a family 
law perspective, asking who should have custody following an ART mix-up.  While these 
cases fall outside the scope of this Essay because they do not focus on the negligence of the 
clinic, it is interesting to note the complicated questions of parentage and custody that are 
litigated as a result of ART-related negligence. See, e.g., Robert B. v. Susan B., 109 Cal. App. 
4th 1109 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (describing a situation in which embryos contractually 
belonging to a couple, and sharing genetic material with the husband, were mistakenly 
implanted in a single woman, resulting in birth of half-siblings); Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 276 
715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (a woman gave birth to twins and subsequently 
learned that one child was not biologically related to her because the fertility clinic mistakenly 
implanted another couple’s embryos in her uterus). 
 24. Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank LLC, 230 F. Supp. 3d 865, 867 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Complaint at 2–4, Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank LLC, No. 2-16-0694, 2017 
WL 2800062 (Ill. App. Ct. June 27, 2017). 
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subsequently contacted Midwest to obtain additional vials of 380’s sperm.27  
During this conversation, Midwest informed Cramblett that they had never 
sent her sperm from 380.28  Rather, the sperm that Midwest had shipped, and 
with which Cramblett was inseminated, came from Donor No. 330 (330), an 
African American man.29 
Following the birth of her biracial child, Cramblett brought suit against 
Midwest, filing concurrent actions at the state and federal levels.  In her 
complaints, Cramblett claimed that the sperm bank breached its duty of care 
by sending Cramblett the wrong sperm, and that, subsequently, Midwest was 
liable for: (1) wrongful birth;30 (2) willful and wanton misconduct; and (3) 
common law negligence.31  At present, the federal case has been stayed while 
Cramblett’s case is on appeal at the state level.32 
2. Maher v. Vaughn, Silverberg & Associates: Swapping Selected Donors 
In 2009, Heidi Maher sought the assistance of Texas Fertility Center and 
Austin IVF to aid her in becoming pregnant.33  As part of this process, 
“Maher purchased sperm from two different donors, one vial from Donor 
1999 and two vials from Donor 11076.”34  Maher designated 11076 as a 
backup, stating that her preference was to conceive a child with 1999’s sperm 
but recognized that because only one vial of his sperm was available, she 
would be wise to have a substitute.35  To her delight, Maher successfully 
conceived using 1999’s sperm and gave birth to her first child.36 
Two years later, Maher returned to Texas Fertility Center and Austin IVF 
seeking to become pregnant again.37  Maher desired that her second child be 
full-siblings with her first, and worked with the clinic to find two other vials 
of 1999’s sperm through the Registration Repository System.38  In June 
2011, Maher underwent an IVF procedure, where the sperm from Donor 
1999 was supposed to be used.39 
Maher became concerned a few weeks later that the IVF treatment failed 
and contacted Austin IVF to ensure enough of 1999’s sperm remained to 
 
 27. Nick Viviani, Ohio Woman Sues Sperm Bank After Racial Mix-Up, WIBW (Oct. 2, 
2014, 3:35 PM), https://www.wibw.com/home/headlines/Ohio-Woman-Sues-Sperm-Bank-
After-Racial-Mix-Up--277937801.html [https://perma.cc/H6MH-D9F2]. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Cramblett, 230 F. Supp. at 867. 
 30. Cramblett alleged wrongful birth in the initial complaint she filed at the state level. 
Cramblett, 2017 WL 2800062, at *2.  Cramblett later amended her state complaint to remove 
the wrongful birth allegation and did not allege this claim in her federal complaint. See 
Cramblett, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 868. 
 31. Complaint at 9–11, Cramblett, 230 F. Supp. 3d 865. 
 32. Cramblett, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 874. 
 33. Maher v. Vaughn, Silverberg & Assocs., LLP, 95 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1002 (W.D. Tex. 
2015). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. at 1002–03. 
 36. Id. at 1003. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Complaint at 3, Maher, 95 F. Supp. 3d 999 (No. 13-543). 
 39. Id. 
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perform the procedure again.40  When the clinic confirmed that they still had 
two vials of 1999’s sperm, Maher asked how that could be possible when one 
of the vials was used for her most recent round of IVF.41  After a few hours 
of phone calls, Maher learned that the clinic had accidentally fertilized her 
eggs using sperm from 11076—the backup donor.42 
In her subsequent lawsuit, Maher alleged: (1) negligence per se; (2) 
negligent hiring, supervision, and/or management; (3) offensive physical 
contact or battery; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(IIED).43  Ultimately, Maher’s case was dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.44 
3. Harnicher v. University of Utah Medical Center: Mistakenly Used 
Donor Looked Nothing Like Intended Father 
Stephanie and David Harnicher consulted the University of Utah Medical 
Center to assist with infertility issues.45  After their initial attempts to 
conceive using David’s sperm were unsuccessful, their doctor suggested the 
couple try “a procedure known as ‘micromanipulation’ where[] holes are 
drilled in the mother’s harvested ova to facilitate fertilization.”46  Afterwards, 
the ova are left in a petri dish with harvested sperm and, once fertilized, are 
implanted in a woman’s uterus.47  The Harnichers agreed to try 
micromanipulation with a mixture of David’s sperm and the sperm of an 
anonymous donor.48 
To choose a donor, the Harnichers reviewed profiles provided by the 
clinic, and ultimately selected Donor No. 183 (183) because he had similar 
physical characteristics to David.49  The sperm mixture was then created and 
the micromanipulation performed, resulting in the birth of triplets.50  A few 
months later, one of the children became ill and required blood tests, leading 
the Harnichers to discover that the child’s blood type did not match David or 
183.51  A subsequent DNA test revealed that the child’s father was Donor 
No. 83, a donor the Harnichers had allegedly selected as a backup to 183, and 
who looked nothing like David.52 
The Harnichers brought suit alleging: (1) medical malpractice; and (2) 
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) “for using sperm from a 
 
 40. Id. at 3–4. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Maher, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 1003–04. 
 44. See id. at 1012–13. 
 45. Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 68 (Utah 1998). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. There was an issue of fact in this case as to whether the Harnichers actually made this 
donor preference known. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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donor other than the one that the couple had allegedly selected.”53  The state 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the clinic on the grounds 
that no physical injury or illness supported a finding of NIED or medical 
malpractice.54  The Utah Supreme Court affirmed.55 
II. THE ELEMENTS OF EXISTING CAUSES OF ACTION EMPLOYED BY 
PLAINTIFFS IN ART-RELATED NEGLIGENCE CASES AND PROPOSED 
ALTERNATIVES 
Given ART’s novelty, plaintiffs’ claims often do not fit squarely within 
one tort.  This confusion is illustrated by the cases above; each case alleges a 
separate tort, even though the plaintiffs suffered similar harms.  In an attempt 
to clarify these disparate theories, this section lays out the torts alleged in 
Cramblett, Maher, and Harnicher, the Singapore Court of Appeal’s novel 
“loss of genetic affinity” tort, and the proposed adoption of an all-
encompassing tort of “reproductive negligence.” 
A. Existing Tort Theories Relied on by Plaintiffs in ART-Related 
Negligence Cases 
In their respective cases, the plaintiffs in Cramblett, Maher, and Harnicher 
relied on a number of tort-based causes of action.  These claims have been 
categorized into four groups: (1) wrongful birth, wrongful life, and wrongful 
conception; (2) emotional distress claims; (3) negligence-based claims; and 
(4) medical malpractice.  The elements of the claims in each of these 
categories are laid out below. 
1. A Trio of Wrongs: Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Life, and Wrongful 
Conception 
In her initial complaint, Cramblett relied on the tort theory of “wrongful 
birth.”  Within the U.S. legal framework, wrongful birth is situated as a 
companion tort to “wrongful life” and “wrongful conception.”56  While 
similar in scope, each of these torts addresses a different theory of wrong.  
For instance, parents bring wrongful birth suits when they believe a 
defendant’s negligence caused them to give birth to a child with significant 
genetic abnormalities.57  Wrongful conception suits are brought when 
parents contend that “a negligently performed sterilization procedure” 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 72. 
 56. See MASS. CONTINUING LEG. EDU., INC., CIVIL CAUSES OF ACTION IN MASSACHUSETTS: 
WRONGFUL BIRTH/CONCEPTION/LIFE 651 (2012). 
 57. See Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 9 n.3 (Mass. 1990).  While she did not 
ultimately rely on the claim of “wrongful birth,” and seems to have misconstrued the tort with 
common law negligence in her initial complaint, Cramblett’s even momentary reliance on this 
tort as a cause of action is egregious—namely, her willingness to conflate the difficulty of 
raising a child afflicted by serious genetic disorders with the “harm” of raising a biracial child. 
120 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 87 
occurred, leading to the birth of a healthy, but unplanned for child.58  And 
individuals born with severe genetic abnormalities levy allegations of 
wrongful life when they believe that the defendant’s negligence caused them 
to be born.59  Damages for these torts may include upkeep costs, which are 
the costs associated with the challenges of raising the child or, in the case of 
wrongful life, caring for oneself.60 
2. Emotional Distress Claims: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The plaintiffs in Maher and Harnicher both relied on emotional distress 
claims, with Maher alleging IIED and the Harnichers alleging NIED.  These 
claims are similar in scope because they both require that plaintiffs make a 
prima facie showing of: (1) extreme emotional distress; and (2) causation 
between that distress and the defendant’s actions.  But they differ in the 
requisite showing of mens rea.61  IIED requires that the defendant 
intentionally or recklessly engaged in “extreme and outrageous” conduct, 
whereas NIED requires merely that the defendant’s conduct rose to the level 
of negligence.62 
3. Shades of Negligence: Common Law Negligence, Negligence Per Se, 
and Gross Negligence 
Many plaintiffs in ART-related negligence cases allege common law 
negligence in bringing suit against their ART providers, and the plaintiffs in 
Maher and Cramblett allege two gradations of common law negligence: 
negligence per se and gross negligence. 
First, Maher claimed that the ART clinic’s actions amounted to negligence 
per se.  Under the doctrine of negligence per se, “[a]n actor is negligent if, 
without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is designed to protect against 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532 (N.C. 1985).  Many jurisdictions do 
not recognize these torts as distinct causes of action, finding instead that these claims fall 
within the broader framework of negligence. See, e.g., Philips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 
537 (D.S.C. 1980); Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 2000); Dehn v. Edgecombe, 834 
A.2d 146 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005). 
 60. See Stephen Todd, Wrongful Conception, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, 27 
SYDNEY L. REV. 525, 526 (2005). 
 61. See, e.g., Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A cause of action 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires that a plaintiff show ‘1) serious 
emotional distress, 2) actually and proximately caused by 3) wrongful conduct 4) by a 
defendant who should have foreseen that the conduct would cause such distress.’” (quoting 
Brooks v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 2d 613, 618 (N.D. Cal. 1998))); Standard Fruit & 
Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex. 1998) (“To recover under [IIED], a 
plaintiff must prove that 1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, 2) the conduct was 
‘extreme and outrageous,’ 3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff emotional 
distress, and 4) the resulting emotional distress was severe.” (citing Twyman v. Twyman, 855 
S.W.2d 619, 621–22 (Tex. 1993))). 
 62. John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. 
L. REV. 789, 806, 809 (2007). 
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the type of accident the actor’s conduct causes.”63  Maher claimed that the 
clinic’s actions violated the Current Good Tissue Practice regulations, which 
mandate that facilities storing eggs and sperm “must control [their] storage 
areas and stock room to prevent mix-ups.”64  Had Maher’s case proceeded, 
she would have needed to show that the mix-up occurred because of non-
compliance with the statute. 
Second, Cramblett alleged that the clinic’s actions amounted to gross 
negligence, which is essentially a heightened form of negligence, requiring 
that the plaintiff show the negligent party “fail[ed] to exercise[] even slight 
or scant care of ‘slight diligence.’”65  Large damage awards, that may include 
punitive damages, often accompany findings of gross negligence.66 
4. Medical Malpractice and the Requirement of Physical Injury 
The Harnichers alleged medical malpractice.  While medical malpractice 
is highly state-law dependent, it is typically required that the plaintiff show 
there is a: (1) patient-physician relationship giving rise to a duty of care; (2) 
violation of the professional standard of care; (3) injury; and (4) causation.67  
Importantly, courts generally only afford relief for physical injury.68 
B. Proposed Alternative Torts for Addressing ART-Related Negligence in 
the United States 
Recognizing the limitations of existing tort theories, courts and scholars 
have begun considering the legal questions posed by ART-related negligence 
through new lenses.  Two of these new tort-based approaches are discussed 
in detail here.  The first is the “loss of genetic affinity” tort created by the 
Singapore Court of Appeal, and the second is scholar Dov Fox’s proposal for 
a broad “reproductive negligence” tort. 
1. The “Loss of Genetic Affinity” 
In the Singapore case, the Singapore Supreme Court awarded damages for 
the plaintiff-father’s loss of genetic affinity with the child.  It determined that 
genetic affinity, and the resulting shared biological experience between 
parents and their offspring, “carries deep socio-cultural significance[,]” 
which for some couples is “deeply important to religious and cultural 
belonging.”69  Moreover, the Court noted that genetic affinity is not exclusive 
to the parent-child relationship but rather “affects the parents’ relationship 
 
 63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 (AM. LAW. INST. 2010). 
 64. Complaint at 5, Maher v. Vaughn, Silverberg & Assocs., LLP, 95 F. Supp. 3d 999 
(W.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 13-543) (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 1271.260(a)). 
 65. 57(A) AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 227 (2017). 
 66. See Punitive Damages: Available Where There Is Gross Negligence, 42 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 137, 137 (1967). 
 67. See BARRY A. LINDHAL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 25:1 (2d 
ed. 2018). 
 68. See Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 165–66 (2017). 
 69. ACB v. Thomson Med. Pte. Ltd., [2017] SCGA 20 ¶ 128. 
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with their extended relations; the child’s relationship with his/her siblings; as 
well as the family’s relationship with the wider community.”70  The Court 
concluded that the couple’s interest in “maintaining the integrity of . . . 
reproductive plans . . . is one which that law should recognise and protect.”71 
On the issue of damages, the Court concluded that the cost of raising the 
child, so-called “upkeep damages,”72 served as a useful benchmark for 
calculation purposes and awarded the couple 30 percent of the amount 
initially requested.73  The Court contended that the substantial award 
acknowledged and legitimized the harms suffered by the plaintiffs without 
improperly attempting to place a value on the life of the child.74 
2.  Reproductive Negligence 
In his article, Reproductive Negligence, scholar Dov Fox lays out a 
framework for addressing an array of harms that plaintiffs may suffer in the 
field of reproduction.  Fox argues that rather than hinge new torts on specific 
cases, it would be better to adopt a broad framework that enables “citizens to 
locate their rights when they sense a violation of their interests in 
procreation.”75  He terms this broad framework “reproductive negligence.”  
Fox believes this broad tort theory—encompassing everything from abortion 
to IVF to parentage—would give courts more flexibility in addressing 
reproduction-related harms, lessening the chance that these wrongs would go 
unaddressed.76 
Fox argues that incorporation of this tort would accomplish several goals.  
First, it would underscore the central importance of procreation-based rights, 
and second, it would “affirm shared values, . . . compensate victims, and . . . 
deter professional misconduct.”77  Fox also argues this theory’s breadth 
makes it “uniquely equipped to meet emerging challenges about genetic 
modification that loom on the horizon.”78 
In addressing the issue of damages, Fox suggests a two-step process in 
which the trier-of-fact first determines the severity of the injury, followed by 
an analysis of “the extent to which professional wrongdoing is responsible 
for having caused that injury.”79  After completing this inquiry, Fox proposes 
that these cases be sorted into three categories: resemblance and race; ability 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. ¶ 135. 
 72. The court stressed that the damage award was not meant to represent upkeep costs, 
stating, “[l]est there be any confusion, we clarify that an award for loss of genetic affinity and 
an award of upkeep costs rest on very different theoretical bases.  The former is an award of 
damages for non-pecuniary loss as compensation for the plaintiff-mother’s loss of genetic 
affinity; the latter is an award for pecuniary loss arising from the expenses incurred in relation 
to the raising of the child.” Id. ¶ 149. 
 73. Id. ¶¶ 148, 150. 
 74. Id. ¶ 210. 
 75. Fox, supra note 68, at 211. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 241. 
 79. Id. at 226. 
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and disability; and non-medical trait selection.80  Under the “resemblance 
and race” category, Fox argues that situations where a negligent action 
caused the child’s race to differ from that of the child’s intended parent 
deserve greater compensation than cases where “inconsequential” 
phenotypic traits are at issue.81  Under the “ability and disability” category, 
Fox argues that selecting against certain categories of disability should be 
compensated when children are born with the trait that was selected for 
elimination.82  And finally, within the third category, Fox argues that non-
medical trait selection should also be compensated, albeit to a lesser degree.83 
III. NEITHER EXISTING NOR PROPOSED TORT THEORIES ADEQUATELY 
ENABLE COURTS TO ADDRESS ISSUES OF ART-RELATED NEGLIGENCE 
ART-related negligence poses significant challenges for courts due to a 
dearth of case law and the sensitive ethical and moral questions that these 
situations raise.  As the Singapore Court stressed, damage awards for ART-
related negligence tow dangerously close to assigning a value to human 
life—a moral quagmire that courts must avoid.84  Allowing these harms to 
go unaddressed, however, disincentivizes ART clinics from taking necessary 
precautionary measures to avoid such mishaps, increasing the risk or error.  
Accordingly, the United States needs a clear framework to enable ART 
patients to seek redress when their reproductive plans are thwarted by 
negligence on the part of ART clinics.  This section discusses the 
inadequacies of the existing tort categories for addressing the unique 
challenges posed by this class of claims, and evaluates whether the novel tort 
of “loss of genetic affinity” or the broader category of “reproductive 
negligence” would adequately address these concerns. 
A. Existing Tort Theories Do Not Adequately Address the Concerns 
Propagated by ART-Related Negligence 
Existing tort theories were not developed to cover the complicated issues 
posed by ART.  The following subsection explains why the torts alleged by 
the plaintiffs in Cramblett, Maher, and Harnicher were inappropriately 
alleged. 
1. The “Trio of Wrongs” Do Not Apply in Situations Where a Healthy 
Child Is Born 
As illustrated by Cramblett, the companion torts of wrongful birth, 
wrongful life, and wrongful conception do not cover all possible 
 
 80. See id. at 231–40. 
 81. Fox is not concerned with the consequences of this court-sponsored “race-matching” 
because he believed “racial sorting in family formation will garner broad enough support to 
sustain public policy objections.” Id. at 234. 
 82. See id. at 234–37.  This category appears to match the theory behind wrongful birth 
suits. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. 
 83. See id. at 240. 
 84. ACB v. Thomson Med. Pte. Ltd., [2017] SCGA 20 ¶ 210. 
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consequences of ART-related negligence.  Wrongful birth was developed to 
cover instances where a child is born with serious genetic defects due to 
negligent pre-birth screening.  Applying this tort to a situation like Cramblett, 
where the plaintiff’s predominant concern was the skin color of the child, 
would force courts to articulate and endorse racial hierarchies by deeming 
that children born with “unselected” skin tones are effectively born with 
“serious genetic defects.”  This result cannot be supported.  Accordingly, the 
base elemental requirements of wrongful birth suits are inappropriate for 
claims of ART-related negligence in situations where the ART-patient’s 
complaint is that the child does not have the genes that were explicitly 
selected. 
Wrongful conception and wrongful life are similarly ill-suited to 
encompass these claims.  Wrongful conception suits are typically brought 
following a negligently performed sterilization procedure.  But patients in 
ART-related negligence cases undergo ART procedures in an effort to 
become pregnant—not to prevent it from happening.  Wrongful life is also 
inapt because it enables individuals born with serious genetic defects to bring 
suit, not the individual’s parents. 
Moreover, the terminology employed by these torts is problematic.  By 
deeming the very existence of a human being as “wrongful” courts condone 
placing a dollar value on the lives of those born outside of the genetic “norm.”  
While this problem exists in current litigation involving these torts, it is even 
more pronounced when a healthy child is born as courts would be forced to 
value phenotypic traits like skin or eye color.  Accordingly, wrongful birth, 
wrongful life, and wrongful conception claims are ill-suited to address ART-
related negligence. 
2. Judicial Cabining of Emotional Distress Claims Renders NIED and 
IIED Inapplicable in ART-Related Negligence Cases 
Neither NIED nor IIED can be appropriately applied to ART-related 
negligence claims.  First, IIED requires that the defendant engaged in 
“extreme and outrageous” conduct, and while there could be situations 
involving a malicious ART clinic employee, these instances would be few 
and far between.  In the cases described here, the clinic employees simply 
misread or misheard the instructions as to which sperm vial should be used; 
conduct which hardly reaches the level of “extreme and outrageous.” 
The scope of NIED is similarly ill-suited for ART-related negligence 
cases.  NIED has been consciously cabined by courts to the point where it 
now requires that the defendant’s negligent actions caused the plaintiff to 
either narrowly escape physical injury or bear witness to a traumatic physical 
injury.  Physical injury, whether witnessed or narrowly avoided, plays no role 
in the claims brought by plaintiffs in these cases.  Consequently, allowing an 
NIED claim to proceed in these cases would inappropriately expand the 
current scope of the action. 
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3. The Physical Injury Requirements Imposed by Negligence and Medical 
Malpractice Would Foreclose Plaintiffs’ Abilities to Seek Redress 
Facially, common law negligence and medical malpractice seem to be the 
most amenable to adaptation for ART-related negligence claims, but even 
these torts will be inapplicable in most cases as these torts require a finding 
of physical injury.  Because plaintiffs in these types of cases are not often 
physically injured, courts are unlikely to find liability under these theories.85 
Negligence per se is also inapplicable in most ART situations because the 
United States does not currently have strong regulations surrounding ART,86 
and a showing of negligence per se requires that the negligent action violated 
a statute or regulation.87  Given the current lack of political will to regulate 
this space, it is unlikely that this situation will change anytime soon.  
Accordingly, the existing tort landscape within the United States does not 
encompass the harms stemming from ART-related negligence, which leaves 
plaintiffs without options for redress and disincentivizes ART providers from 
guarding against these types of mistakes. 
B. Novel Approaches to ART-Related Negligence Are Either Over- or 
Under-Inclusive 
The two novel approaches to ART-related negligence detailed in Part II.B, 
the “loss of genetic affinity” and the proposal calling for a broad category of 
“reproductive negligence,” similarly fail to appropriately capture the scope 
of the harms detailed here.  Adoption of the “loss of genetic affinity,” for 
example, would be too narrow, while “reproductive negligence” would be 
too broad.  This section details why these two approaches lead to a 
“Goldilocks problem,” and proposes a third pathway that may be “just right.” 
1. “Loss of Genetic Affinity” is Too Narrow to Address Even the Cases 
Discussed Here 
The “loss of genetic affinity” applies exclusively to situations in which a 
child resulting from an ART procedure is not, but was intended to be, 
genetically related to one or both of the parents opting-into the procedure.  
While this tort accurately captured the plaintiffs’ injury in the Singapore case, 
it does not address situations like Cramblett, Maher, and Harnicher where 
the plaintiffs consented to the use of donor sperm.  However, the plaintiffs in 
all of these cases were injured for the same reason—the ART clinic used the 
wrong sperm.  In the Singapore case, the ART clinic used sperm other than 
the plaintiff’s husband’s, whereas in Cramblett, Maher, and Harnicher, the 
clinic used the sperm from the wrong donor.  The identical nature of the 
negligent action taken by the ART clinics in each of these cases logically 
implies that the plaintiffs should be able to rely on the same tort category for 
 
 85. This foreclosure also prevents plaintiffs from bringing gross negligence claims, which 
require a foundational showing of negligence. 
 86. See Fox, supra note 68, at 161–62. 
 87. See note 63 and accompanying text. 
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relief.  But if the “loss of genetic affinity” tort were adopted by the American 
legal system, only the plaintiffs like those in the Singapore case would 
prevail.  Accordingly, the “loss of genetic affinity” tort is under-inclusive, 
failing to capture the array of harms that may arise following a genetic 
material mix-up.88  Accordingly, adoption of the narrow tort of “loss of 
genetic affinity” would not significantly move the needle on courts’ ability 
to address ART-related negligence. 
2. The Breadth of “Reproductive Negligence” Undermines Serious Moral 
and Ethical Concerns Posed by ART-Related Negligence 
On the opposite end of the spectrum is Fox’s proposal for a blanket 
category of “reproductive negligence” that encompasses everything from 
abortion rights to contraception to ART procedures gone awry.  Fox argues 
this tort would cover all situations in which an individual’s reproductive 
choices are confounded while maintaining the responsiveness to societal 
norms that is often associated with common law doctrines.89 
Courts currently engage in hyper-cautious decision-making in the 
reproductive realm because of the high probability that any decision rendered 
will contravene moral or ethical standards.  Given the divisiveness of these 
issues, this caution is appropriate.  However, this area lacks a well-developed 
body of case law, which increases the risk that judges will turn to their 
personal value systems when evaluating these claims.  Fox’s claim that the 
breadth of the “reproductive negligence” doctrine will confer the benefits 
associated with common law doctrines is consequently inapt because he fails 
to recognize that these benefits are derived from the slow, methodical 
development over time—rather than in the one fell swoop he proposes. 
Moreover, Fox’s analysis of damage calculations further highlights the 
dangers of his approach.  Fox’s proposed two-step analysis would allow a 
trier-of-fact to award higher damages in situations where a child is born with 
the “wrong” skin tone, as opposed to the “wrong” eye color, on the basis that 
“race-matching” children and parents is more important than ensuring the 
parents’ other genetic choices are fulfilled.90  This scenario would quickly 
lead to judicially-sanctioned hierarchies of traits where a quick analysis of 
damage awards would likely reveal that certain traits, for instance white skin, 
are “worth more” than others.  The court system cannot be complicit in 
endorsing and propagating such a system.  Accordingly, Fox’s proposal is 
inapt. 
 
 88. This incongruence is particularly important in a time when family structures are 
increasingly diverse.  For example, single women and LGBTQ couples rely on donor genetic 
material to conceive.  By limiting recovery for genetic material mix-ups to situations in which 
the sperm and ova intended for use come from a heterosexual couple, courts would 
impermissibly favor historically-prescribed reproductive relationships over non-traditional 
family structures. 
 89. Fox, supra note 68, at 211. 
 90. Id. at 231–34. 
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C.  Adoption of Negligent Disruption of Genetic Planning Would Give 
Courts Enough Footing to Begin Building a Common Law Doctrine 
Capable of Addressing More Reproductive Complex Harms 
While addressing the myriad of harms that fall under the category of 
“reproductive negligence” is certainly a worthy goal, the complex moral and 
ethical questions surrounding these issues mandate a slower approach than 
that advocated by Fox.  At the same time, a narrowly construed tort like the 
“loss of genetic affinity” will not arise often enough to foster change and 
protect ART patients.  For that reason, a middle approach should be taken 
that enables courts to build a conceptual framework for dealing with sensitive 
reproduction-related issues, while signaling to the public at large—and 
consequently legislatures—that norms surrounding these situations must be 
established. 
The harms suffered by plaintiffs in cases like the Singapore case, 
Cramblett, Maher, and Harnicher can be captured under the proposed tort 
category of “negligent disruption of genetic planning” (NDGP).  Adoption 
of this novel tort would enable courts to start addressing issues related to 
reproductive negligence at a measured pace, and within the confines of a 
category of claims that does not undermine widely held societal values.  To 
ensure proper doctrinal development, NDGP should be limited to situations 
where a healthy child is born following an ART procedure but, because of 
negligence on the part of the ART provider, the child is born without the 
genes selected by the ART patient.  In order to find ART clinic liability under 
NDGP, a plaintiff would have to establish that: (1) a genetic preference or 
set of preferences were agreed to between the ART provider and the patient; 
(2) the ART clinic negligently performed the ART procedure; and (3) this 
negligence caused the absence of the genetic preferences in the resulting 
child.  These elements adequately cover the cases discussed here, and are 
specific enough that they would enable courts to begin developing a common 
law doctrine around ART-related negligence without risking over-stepping 
judicial bounds. 
While the NDGP approach solves the under- and over-inclusiveness 
problems posed by the proposed adoption of either the “loss of genetic 
affinity” or “reproductive negligence” torts, the question of damages still 
remains.  Ideally, enough political will could be mustered to impose a 
damages cap on these claims, thereby limiting the potential for triers-of-fact 
to award disparate damages based on which traits they personally deem 
desirable, and avoiding the problem of a judicially-sanctioned hierarchy of 
physical characteristics.  Absent this political will, courts would be wise to 
use early cases as benchmarks for appropriate compensation to guard against 
the valuation of, for example, one skin tone over another.  By adopting 
NDGP, courts would be able to address the inadequacies of the current tort 
landscape in protecting victims of ART-related negligence, and begin a 
conscientious march towards providing protection for a broader array of 
reproduction-related harms. 
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CONCLUSION 
ART use will only continue to grow over the coming decades, and with it, 
the risk of mistakes.  The American tort system must find a way to categorize 
and compensate individuals whose reproductive choices are thwarted by this 
negligence.  Adopting a tort meant to cover a broad category of reproduction-
related wrongs implicates too many moral and ethical questions at once, 
whereas adoption of a narrow tort that only applies to one-in-a-million cases 
will not prepare the courts or society for the ever-increasing number of these 
cases.  Accordingly, courts should test the waters of ART-related negligence 
claims by evaluating harms stemming from NDGP.  This approach would 
put the public on notice that the issues surrounding reproductive negligence 
need to be addressed without forcing the judiciary to overstep their 
boundaries. 
 
